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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE BEST WAY FORWARD
Stephen E. Henderson*
ABSTRACT
We finally have a federal ‘test case.’ In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme
Court is poised to set the direction of the Fourth Amendment in the digital age. The
case squarely presents how the twentieth-century third party doctrine will fare in
contemporary times, and the stakes could not be higher. This Article reviews the
Carpenter case and how it fits within the greater discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment third party doctrine and location surveillance, and I express a hope that the
Court will be both a bit ambitious and a good measure cautious.
As for ambition, the Court must recognize that the fundamental liberty protected
by the Fourth Amendment—the right to be “secure in [our] persons, houses, papers,
and effects”—is squarely at issue when the government seeks to track our longer
term movements, whether historically or prospectively. It is not business records,
beepers, automobiles, phones, cameras, drones, or some other coincidental medium
or technology that is at issue: it is our constitutionally protected liberty. Thus, the
Court should hold that law enforcement acquisition of longer term cell site location
information (CSLI) constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, ending the monolithic,
anachronistic third party doctrine.
As to the precise durational trigger and as to what particular law enforcement
restraint would be correspondingly reasonable, the Court should be cautious, as it
was in United States v. Jones and Grady v. North Carolina. It will have taken the
better part of a half century to undo the Court’s expansive third-party declaration in
United States v. Miller, an unnecessary overreach best relegated to history. Thus,
while the Court should not abandon Fourth Amendment development through
reasonable reliance, it should remand these constitutional determinations for lower
court development. Those courts should consider not only Fourth Amendment
precedents, but also how state supreme courts have independently interpreted their
own constitutions.
* Judge Haskell A. Holloman Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma. JD Yale
Law School, 1999; BS in Electrical Engineering U.C. Davis, 1995. I would like to thank
Adam Gershowitz, Will Cook, and everyone who helped with and participated in the Big
Data, National Security, and the Fourth Amendment Symposium. Everything was top notch.
And I would like to thank Jordan Rubin and Matthew Tokson for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
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I. THE CARPENTER CASE
Timothy Carpenter has ended up an ironic criminal: he organized multiple armed
robberies targeting smartphones, only to have his downfall be (in part) records of his
own cell phone usage.1 As is so often the case when it comes to our Fourth Amend-
ment rights,2 he is hardly a good or representative spokesperson. But the courts
suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to protect us all,3 and so what
is relevant is his constitutional claim, not his personal desert. Here is his story.
1 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884–85 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490–92 (1976) (“Application of the [exclusionary] rule
thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. . . . Evidence obtained by
police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that the
frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite the absence of supportive empirical
evidence, we have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law
enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to
disregard it. More importantly, over the long term, this demonstration that our society attaches
serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.”).
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A. The Investigation
Beginning in 2010 and continuing into 2012, several men robbed RadioShack
and T-Mobile stores in southeastern Michigan and northwestern Ohio, netting mobile
phones they would thereafter sell.4 A larger group assisted in these robberies as look-
outs and getaway drivers.5 The organizer was typically Timothy Carpenter, who
would also serve as a lookout.6 That latter role put him near the crimes during their
commission, in which he was joined by his half-brother, Timothy Sanders.7
Faced with a string of robberies, the government will sometimes use cell tower
dumps to identify those near multiple crimes,8 but such methods may or may not have
been used in this case. What we know is that four men were arrested, and that one
of them confessed.9 He provided his cell phone number and those of co-conspirators,
which naturally left investigators wanting the records of the persons with whom he
communicated.10
Pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communications Act,11 the FBI thus
obtained 127 days of Carpenter’s phone records (weighing in at 186 pages) and
eighty-eight days of Sanders’s.12 These records included “cell site information . . .
at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls.”13 Using
that cell-site location information (CSLI), a special agent created maps showing the
proximity of both Carpenter and Sanders to the robberies during their commission.14
These maps and related testimony helped lead to their conviction and, in Carpenter’s
case, to a sentence of over 100 years in prison.15
4 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85.
5 Id. at 884.
6 Id. Carpenter would often also supply the guns used by those who would rob the stores.
Id.
7 Id. at 884–85.
8 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance
After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013) [hereinafter Henderson, Location Surveillance After Jones] (describ-
ing and analyzing such an investigation); Verizon’s Transparency Report for the 1st Half of
2017: U.S. Report, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/us-re
port/ [https://perma.cc/W9UL-JKTM] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (noting that cell tower dumps
are “being used much more frequently by law enforcement”).
9 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.
10 Id.
11 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
12 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886. A much smaller amount of data was also obtained from
a second provider. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
13 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.
14 Id. at 885.
15 Id. Carpenter’s sentence is so long because he was convicted of five counts of “aiding
and abbetting the use or carriage of a firearm during a federal crime of violence,” a crime that
for any second and further conviction carries a mandatory minimum twenty-five-year
498 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:495
B. The CSLI
A mobile phone is in regular communication with at least one cell tower—often
the nearest tower—anytime the phone is ‘active,’ typically meaning anytime it is
turned on.16 Were this not the case, it would be impossible to receive a call.17 Therefore,
in theory, the mobile phone provider knows—or at least its computers know—to
which tower subscribers are nearest and, because those towers use different antennas
for different directions, within which ‘sector’ or ‘pie piece’ the subscriber is located.18
In other words, if a given cell tower serves a radius of two miles and uses sectors of
60 degrees, and if we imagine the coverage area as a circle in two dimensions, then
the provider knows the subscriber location to within 2.1 square miles, as shown in
Figure 1.19 Why 2.1 square miles? Because a circle has an area of pi multiplied by
consecutive sentence. Id. at 884; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). Sanders was sentenced to
just over fourteen years. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885.
16 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885. The user can prevent such automated communication by
putting her device in ‘airplane,’ ‘flight,’ or ‘standalone’ mode, which turns off radio service.
See, e.g., Use Airplane Mode on Your iPhone, iPad, iPod Touch, and Apple Watch, APPLE,
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204234 [https://perma.cc/PJ8P-LMEW] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017). At least she can do so unless the CIA or someone else has hacked her device.
See Ira “Gus” Hunt, CIA Chief Technology Officer, Address at Gigaom Structure Data Event
(Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUPd2uMiXXg (at 12:15) (“You are
aware of the fact that somebody can know where you are at all times, because you carry a
mobile device, even if that mobile device is turned off. You know this, I hope? Yes? No?
Alright; well, you should.”); see also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based
Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12–14 (2010) [hereinafter
Location Based Technologies Hearing] (testimony of Professor Matt Blaze) (explaining the
technology of mobile telephony).
17 See Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 16, at 14.
18 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885; Stephanie K. Pell, Location Tracking, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 44, 47–48 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds.,
2017).
19 The provider can make a better estimate of location based on signal strength, which
can be correlated with distance from the tower, and can do even better if the signal can be
triangulated using several towers. See Phil Locke, Cell Tower Triangulation—How It Works,
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 1, 2012), https://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2012
/06/01/cell-tower-triangulation-how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/5MNB-YTMA] (describing
triangulation for a group of three-sector towers). But such a precise location will typically
not be calculated, let alone recorded in records later received by law enforcement, at least
not based upon current business practices. See Tom Jackman, Experts Say Law Enforce-
ment’s Use of Cellphone Records Can Be Inaccurate, WASH. POST (June 27, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say-law-enforcements-use-of-cellphone-records
-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_story.html
[https://perma.cc/PTL3-HN3T] [hereinafter Jackman, Experts Say]. Such precision was not
at issue in Carpenter. Thus, I will disregard such details. As will become clear shortly, all
of this is merely a back-of-the-envelope approximation, which—like any scientific model—is
perfectly adequate for some purposes but totally unacceptable for others.
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the radius squared, but given the 60-degree sector, this is only one-sixth of a circle.20
If the subscriber moves out of that sector, her phone will begin communicating with
a different sector or tower, or lose signal, as the case may be.21
Figure 1
A Single Cell Tower (Circular Model)
This model will work for our purposes, but it is at best imprecise. After all,
while electromagnetic waves do distribute spherically—making for a circle in two
dimensions—if this accurately represented cellular coverage, we would be very
unhappy. Just look at Figure 2, in which many a phone user would be without
coverage. So, cell sites are sometimes represented by interlocking hexagons, but that
too is not a physically accurate representation.22 Cell sites need to substantially
overlap in order to seamlessly hand off calls from one site to the other, and every
site is irregular because of obstructions (such as trees and buildings) and signal
reflections.23 Moreover, the goal of the provider’s switching equipment is not to
20 A bit more detail: The area of a circle is computed by multiplying ð by the square of
the radius (ðr2), meaning that in this case the tower has a coverage area of 4ð square miles,
which is approximately 12.6 square miles. That coverage area is segmented into 60 degree
sectors, of which there are six (the 360 degrees of a circle divided into six equal sectors). So,
4ð square miles divided by six (ðr2/6), which is approximately 2.1 square miles.
21 See Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 16, at 13–14.
22 See James Donovan, Cells, Sectors and Antenna Beamforming, COMMSCOPE (May 28,
2014), http://www.commscope.com/Blog/Cells--Sectors-and-Antenna-Beamforming/ [https://
perma.cc/9CNP-76ZE].
23 See What Is a Cell Tower’s Range?, WASH. POST. (June 27, 2014), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/local/what-is-a-cell-towers-range/2014/06/27/a41152ce-fe3b-11e3-b1f4-8e77c
632c07b_graphic.html?utm_term=.96df0b5a6635 [https://perma.cc/6PPU-UP79].
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discern customer location, but to provide excellent service, which might mean using
a farther tower—assuming adequate signal—in order to better balance the load.24 In
short, to quote George Box, “all models are wrong, but some are useful,”25 and since
our only interest will be in ballpark estimates that give a rough sense of CSLI location
precision, we can use circles to keep the math easy. But in a courtroom, lawyers
should exercise significant care.26
Figure 2
Multiple Cell Towers (Circular Model)
Figures 1 and 2 make obvious that the precision of CSLI location information
increases as the number of towers within an area increases, resulting in a correspond-
ing decrease in the coverage area of each tower sector. For example, if the tower
serves a radius of one mile rather than two, the precision of the cell-site location—
using our circular model—increases by a factor of four, placing the subscriber within
a half square mile.27 If the tower serves a radius of one-half mile, then the subscriber
is located within one-tenth (0.1) of a square mile, and so on, and sometimes special-
ized towers serve quite small areas.28
24 See id.; Jackman, Experts Say, supra note 19.
25 GEORGE E. P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RE-
SPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987).
26 Readers may be familiar with the cell-site location dispute relating to the conviction
of Adnan Syed, the central character in the podcast Serial. See Jessica Anderson, Appeal to
Be Heard in ‘Serial’ Case Thursday: Court to Rule on Request for New Trial for Adnan
Syed, Convicted in 2000 Killing, BALT. SUN, June 7, 2017, at 2.
27 The decrease is a factor of four, rather than two, because the area of a circle is propor-
tional to the square of the radius.
28 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting in part) (explaining increasing precision using smaller cells); Pell, supra note 18, at
2017] CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 501
In Carpenter’s case, the relevant cell towers had coverage radii of between one-
half mile and two miles,29 meaning that location precision on our circular, 60-degree
sector model ranges between 0.1 square miles to 2.1 square miles. The Sixth Circuit
reported these figures in square feet, making the numbers much larger30: such sectors
would range from an area of 3.6 million square feet to 58 million square feet (there
of course being 5,280 feet in a mile).31 If a tower had a larger, 120-degree sector—
which some of them did—that upper range doubles to 117 million square feet, or 4.2
square miles.32
So, federal agents obtained 127 days of cell-site information, each datum of
which under our circular model placed Carpenter within an area ranging from 0.1
square miles to 4.2 square miles. In terms that might be somewhat more familiar,
that is a range of 84 acres to 2,700 acres.33 In the college town of Norman,
Oklahoma, where I live and where college football is king, the more precise area
would not place someone at Gaylord Memorial Stadium (were the geographic area
a circle of 0.1 square miles centered there), but she would have to be nearby on
campus; she could certainly not be at the law school.34 The larger area, by contrast,
would mean she could not only be most anywhere on campus, but could also be in
any of the private businesses on our ‘campus corner,’ in many residential neighbor-
hoods, or in our downtown area north of campus.35 In Washington, D.C., where the
48–49 (same); Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 16, at 15, 20, 26–27, 30,
95 (same).
29 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
30 Id.
31 In calculating the sector areas, I have used the original radius of one-half mile and two
miles, respectively, not the rounded square mile values.
32 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889. The Sixth Circuit cites a “3.5 million square-foot to 100
million square-foot area.” Id. The expert on which the court relied obviously either did not
use a circular model, or imprecision arose from a less precise approximation of ð, a more
precise radius, different rounding to significant digits, or other such reasons. The extent of
the deviation is rather meaningless, since surely only the order of magnitude is meaningful
when it comes to millions of square feet. Thus, I have not bothered being consistent in terms
of my own rounding, merely reporting numbers in a precision that seems most approachable.
33 I have once again used the original radii for the calculations, not merely area unit
conversion, and have rounded the result rather cavalierly.
34 See Gaylord Family Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google
.com/maps/place/The+Gaylord+Family+Oklahoma+Memorial+Stadium/@35.205503,
-97.4448048,1571m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x1abd3cf33ea1be12!8m2!3d35.20
58537!4d-97.4423145. Of course, all of this depends upon the particular location of the cell
towers, and the cell site area in our model is a circle sector as opposed to a full circle; these
illustrations are merely intended to give a sense of the size of these areas. In other words, a
0.1 square mile area corresponds to a circle with a radius of about 1,000 feet, and so to give
a sense of how big an area that is, I have centered such a circle on the stadium.
35 See Gaylord Family Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google
.com/maps/place/The+Gaylord+Family+Oklahoma+Memorial+Stadium/@35.2057619,
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Supreme Court sits, the more precise area would not place someone at the courthouse
(again centering a 0.1 square mile circle there), but she would have to be nearby,
perhaps visiting the Library of Congress or the Hart Senate Office Building.36 The
larger area, by contrast, would allow her to reach the Verizon Center, the Navy Yard,
and well past Lincoln Park.37 (If one who does not enjoy math wishes to see areas
plotted on any Google map, a very useful site is available from DaftLogic—merely
bring up a location, left-click some pins into existence, and witness the area of the
covered shape.38)
C. The Sixth Circuit Majority (and Its Mistakes)
Two judges, in an opinion written by Judge Raymond Kethledge, held that
Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 127 days of cell-site in-
formation, meaning that agents obtaining the data did not constitute a Fourth Amend-
ment search.39 The court relied upon the long-standing Fourth Amendment third
-97.4528656,4441m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x1abd3cf33ea1be12!8m2!3d35.20
58537!4d-97.4423145.
36 See United States Supreme Court Building, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google
.com/maps/place/United+States+Supreme+Court+Building,+Washington,+DC+20543
/@38.8895761,-77.0117459,15z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x89b7b82f32bfd767:0x1ab5dfbb5
6f376ca!8m2!3d38.8906116!4d-77.0045361.
37 See United States Supreme Court Building, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com
/maps/place/United+States+Supreme+Court+Building,+Washington,+DC+20543/@38.8
888094,-77.0120395,4241m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x1ab5dfbb56f376ca!8m2
!3d38.8906116!4d-77.0045361+States+Supreme+Court+Building,+Washington,+DC.
38 Google Maps Area Calculator Tool, DAFTLOGIC, https://www.daftlogic.com/projects-goo
gle-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm [https://perma.cc/PDM4-NZ2U] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
39 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402) (“In sum, we hold that the government’s collection of
business records containing cell-site data was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.”).
This holding comports with others in the federal courts, but some states disagree as a matter
of their constitutional law. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 866 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding a mobile phone customer retains no reasonable expectation of privacy even in
prospective CSLI); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding
a mobile phone customer retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in historic CSLI);
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (same); In re Application
of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); United States
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (same for prospective CSLI); In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d. Cir. 2010) (holding the federal Stored Communications Act allows
a magistrate to choose to require a probable cause warrant for historic CSLI); Zanders v.
State, 73 N.E.3d 178 (Ind. 2017) (holding a mobile phone customer retains no reasonable
expectation of privacy in historic CSLI); State v. Jenkins, 884 N.W.2d 429 (Neb. 2016)
(same); Taylor v. State, 371 P.3d 1036 (Nev. 2016) (same); Commonwealth v. Estabrook,
38 N.E.3d 231 (Mass. 2015) (holding the Massachusetts Constitution requires a warrant to
2017] CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 503
party doctrine—the records were business records held by and obtained from a third-
party phone company40—upon the relative imprecision of the location data,41 and
upon Congress’s having spoken through the Stored Communications Act.42 Each of
these grounds is facially attractive on some level but ultimately flawed, at least now
that the issue is before the high court.
1. The Third Party Doctrine
The third party doctrine grew out of a series of Supreme Court decisions in the
1960s and 1970s,43 and is perhaps best summarized by this very expansive language
in United States v. Miller44:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even
if the information is revealed [to the third party] on the assump-
tion that [1] it will be used only for a limited purpose and [2] the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.45
It is possible to distinguish Carpenter’s facts from even this exceedingly broad
claim. The three opinions cited by the Miller Court as establishing the ‘repeated’
holding all concern instances in which a defendant voluntarily spoke to an informant
and those words were at issue.46 Such situations hardly seem to control whether a
mobile phone subscriber retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in her location
obtain over six hours of CSLI); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014) (holding the
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for real-time CSLI); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J.
2013) (holding the New Jersey Constitution requires a warrant to obtain CSLI); see also
United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (requiring a warrant to use
a cell-site simulator, often known as a “Stingray”). Various state statutes also apply. See Cell
Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-phone-loca
tion-tracking-laws-state [https://perma.cc/SGW4-X72D] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
40 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886–89.
41 Id. at 889.
42 Id. at 890.
43 See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 518–21 (2005) [hereinafter
Henderson, Nothing New] (tracing the development of the doctrine).
44 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
45 Id. at 443.
46 See id.; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (permitting use of statements
transmitted to undercover agent); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (permit-
ting use of statements made to informant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39
(1963) (permitting use of statements recorded by undercover agent).
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information merely because that information happens to be conveyed to her phone
provider’s switching equipment according to the technologies of 2017.47
However, Miller itself involved bank records—holding a customer retains no
reasonable expectation of privacy therein48—and a few years later, in Smith v.
Maryland,49 the Court held the same for the telephone numbers which we dial in
order to place calls.50 Taken together with the Court’s Fourth Amendment protection
for the content of such telephone calls,51 the Court seemed to establish what my
scholarship has termed a “limited” third party doctrine.52 Under this limited doctrine,
there is no Fourth Amendment protection for information the government obtains
from a third party when—but only when—the information was originally provided
for that party’s use.
Still, it is hard to know how that 1970s-era limited third party doctrine should
apply to twenty-first century technologies. This question is inherently difficult. For
one, the doctrine has always been contrary to prevailing theories of information
privacy.53 Moreover, the Court has not applied the doctrine in decades, seeming to
purposely avoid at least its robust application.54 Thus, not a single current Justice
participated in the last third party doctrine case.55 At the very least, then, one should
47 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (questioning whether
mobile phone users ‘voluntarily’ convey CSLI information).
48 425 U.S. at 440.
49 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
50 Id. at 743–44.
51 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (declaring Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for the contents of telephone communications); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51
(1967) (same).
52 See Stephen E. Henderson, A Rose by Any Other Name: Regulating Law Enforcement
Bulk Metadata Collection, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 28, 32–36 (2016) [hereinafter
Henderson, Cell Tower Dumps] (explaining my theory and applying it to cell tower dumps).
53 See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (And What They Might
Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 954–60 (2016) [hereinafter
Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines] (explaining information privacy); Stephen
E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 229–33
(2012) (same); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”).
54 See Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 438–42 (2013) (describing five such cases).
55 Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court in 1988, but not in time to participate in the
somewhat relevant case of California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). He did participate
in the public disclosure case of Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), but that doctrine is
importantly different from—or at least an edge case of—the limited third party doctrine po-
tentially at issue in Carpenter. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson
& Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 49, 65–72, 77–80 (2015) [hereinafter Blitz et al.] (describing both the public
disclosure doctrine and the limited third party doctrine).
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question the Sixth Circuit’s facile equivalence between the telephone numbers we
dial in order to place calls and our physical location as we carry a mobile phone.56
Equally unilluminating is the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to differentiate ‘content’ from
‘non-content,’57 which I and others have explained works only for particular technol-
ogies and not as a general rule.58 An attempted content/non-content distinction simply
cannot logically provide the constitutional protection/no-protection trigger.
Moreover, in a different context, the Supreme Court has—consistent with theories
of information privacy—derided a third-party principle as a “cramped notion of
personal privacy”59:
To begin with, both the common law and the literal understandings
of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information
concerning his or her person. In an organized society, there are
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.
Thus the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at
common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the
allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time
rendered it private. According to Webster’s initial definition,
information may be classified as “private” if it is “intended for
or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of
persons: not freely available to the public.”60
More recently, in Riley v. California,61 the Court did not question constitutional pro-
tection for digital contents also held by a third party62 and ridiculed the notion that
56 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402) (falsely claiming that the federal courts “have long
recognized a core distinction” relating to “that kind of information” (emphasis added)).
57 See id. at 887.
58 See Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting
Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975,
1020–24 (2007) (arguing that a content/non-content distinction relies upon—and only func-
tions for—the particular architecture of traditional telephony); see also United States v. Davis,
785 F.3d 498, 537 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing against a content/non-
content distinction); Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends
Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016) (same).
59 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
60 Id. at 763–64 (quoting Private, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1804 (1976)).
61 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
62 Id. at 2490–91. The Court explained as follows:
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical
records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively
different. An Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be
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contemporary technologies necessarily map onto analog-era precedents.63 And, of
course, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has specifically called the third party doctrine into
doubt.64
found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s
private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms
of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. Data on a cell
phone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location infor-
mation is a standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around
town but also within a particular building.
Id. at 2490. To be clear, this is not a direct repudiation of a limited third party doctrine,
because in Riley the police would not be obtaining this information from the third party, but
rather from the defendant’s own device. Nobody should claim that merely because police
could without justification obtain phone numbers dialed from a phone company, police are
therefore free as a matter of Fourth Amendment law to break into the defendant’s home to
obtain the same. My limited point is that the Riley Court understood such information to
remain private despite being shared, just as the Court expressed in Reporters Committee.
The Riley Court continued:
To further complicate the scope of the privacy interests at stake, the
data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be
stored on the device itself. Treating a cell phone as a container whose
contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an
initial matter. But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen. That is
what cell phones, with increasing frequency, are designed to do by
taking advantage of “cloud computing.” Cloud computing is the capacity
of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers
rather than on the device itself. Cell phone users often may not know
whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud,
and it generally makes little difference.
Id. at 2491 (internal citation omitted). It is certainly worthy of note that it makes “little
difference” whether information is held by a third party. See generally David A. Harris, Riley
v. California and the Beginning of the End for the Third-Party Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 895 (2016).
63 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89. The Riley Court stated as follows:
The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone
is “materially indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical
items. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguish-
able from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A
to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A con-
clusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no
substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may
make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that
reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.
Id. (citation omitted).
64 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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So, there are ample grounds for questioning both the wisdom and the logic of
applying the Court’s limited third party doctrine to CSLI, and, as described below,
I believe it would be a substantial mistake for the Court to do so.65 At the very least,
these complications call for a measure of humility in attempting to discern the
existing rule, as well as for caution in applying that rule to technologies and social
norms that were unheard of when the Court last applied it. Nonetheless, one might
defend the Sixth Circuit’s ultimate holding under the Supreme Court’s strict view
of weakened precedent.66 But now that the issue has reached the high court, any such
exceeding deference will no longer be controlling.
2. The Data Precision
As demonstrated above, the CSLI at issue in Carpenter did not pinpoint a
precise location; instead, it sometimes placed Carpenter within a relatively large
geographic area.67 This was very important to the Sixth Circuit majority, which
differentiated law enforcement access to such information from what agents learned
via GPS tracking of a vehicle in United States v. Jones.68
To the extent we are trying to understand the impact of law enforcement access
upon privacy—as the Supreme Court has generally directed69—it seems unassailable
Justice Sotomayor said this:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the dig-
ital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about them-
selves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
65 See infra Parts II–III.
66 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If
a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”);
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“On this point, Smith is
binding precedent.”). For a critique of this rule, see generally C. Steven Bradford, Following
Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1990). More importantly, one can dispute whether Smith has “direct
application” to after-arising technologies.
67 See supra Section I.B.
68 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889. Jones will be discussed more
below, including in Part III.
69 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
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that precision is a relevant criterion. However, as persuasively argued by Judge Jane
Stranch in her concurrence in the Sixth Circuit judgment, it is not the only criterion;
surely duration matters as well.70 In other words, while the duration of a specific
information request will ultimately factor into whether a required level of justifica-
tion has been demonstrated (e.g., police demonstrating a fair probability that six
months of information contains evidence of crime should not enable access to six
years of information),71 the potential for large amounts of an information type to be
privacy invasive also critically informs the privacy implications of permitting
government access to that information type.72 For example, if even terribly vague
location information relating to an entire life is significantly privacy invasive, and
therefore liberty invasive, that argues in favor of some constitutional restriction on
law enforcement gathering at least certain amounts of vague location information.73
For Carpenter, the amount was 127 days.74 While the particular line-drawing
might be difficult and is sure to be contested, Judge Stranch is right to call for “a
new test” that accounts for all relevant factors, as opposed to a test relying solely
upon one (location precision).75 I will shortly return to what I believe that new test
should be—or at least to what it should not be, which might be enough.76
3. The Stored Communications Act
In Carpenter, law enforcement agents obtained the CSLI using a court order
authorized by the Stored Communications Act (SCA).77 In particular, they were
required to offer “specific and articulable facts showing that there [were] reasonable
grounds to believe” the information “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation,”78 a standard often interpreted to equate to reasonable suspicion.79 As
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))). To be clear, this does presup-
pose that there is a search. See infra Part III.
70 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 894–96 (Stranch, J., concurring in the judgment as to the
constitutional issue).
71 See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS Standard 25-5.2 at 100 (3d ed. 2013), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_access.auth
checkdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8CA-ZW6T] [hereinafter ABA LEATPR STANDARDS].
72 Id. Standard 25-4.1 at 69.
73 Law enforcement gathering location data for a lifetime is not merely theoretical. See
Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369–71 (2015) (holding lifetime GPS tracking
to constitute a search).
74 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 895 (Stranch, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 896.
76 See infra Parts III–IV.
77 819 F.3d at 884.
78 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)).
79 See Henderson, Cell Tower Dumps, supra note 52, at 38; Pell, supra note 18, at 61.
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I discuss below, I agree with Justice Samuel Alito and others who have expressed
the importance of legislative determinations in the Fourth Amendment calculus.80
In this instance, however, the Sixth Circuit majority was wrong to think Congress
had meaningfully spoken to the question at hand.
According to the Sixth Circuit, “Congress has specifically legislated on the ques-
tion before us today . . . . The defendants . . . effectively ask us to declare that [Congres-
sional] balance unconstitutional.”81 In the most literal of senses, this is true. The SCA
does generically speak of law enforcement accessing “a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [a] service” that does “not includ[e] the
contents of communications.”82 And CSLI is information pertaining to a customer that
does not seem to constitute the “contents of a wire or electronic communication” as
that phrase is used in the Act.83 But far from legislating about location surveillance, the
SCA was passed in 1986 to address then-novel “computer and telecommunications
technologies” that had nothing to do with mobile telephony.84 As pointed out by
Carpenter, when the SCA was enacted, “cell phones cost over $3,000, were the size
of a large brick, could connect to only fragmentary cellular networks, and were used
by very few people.”85 Today, by contrast, 95% of Americans own a mobile phone.86
Thus, while the Sixth Circuit majority considered Carpenter’s argument ironic
in light of the congressionally enacted SCA—how could he argue for a reasonable
expectation of privacy when Congress had (allegedly) spoken otherwise?87—a better
irony would seem to be the court’s simultaneously defending a prior circuit prece-
dent that declared a portion of the same Act unconstitutional!88 In United States v.
Warshak,89 a Sixth Circuit panel struck down the SCA’s provisions permitting war-
rantless access to emails,90 a situation more analogous than the Carpenter majority—
too fixated on ‘content’ versus ‘non-content’—could appreciate.
80 See infra Part IV.
81 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889.
82 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
83 Id. § 2703(a)–(b).
84 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555; see
also Henderson, Cell Tower Dumps, supra note 52, at 36–38 (examining SCA application
to cell tower dumps). For a different argument—that there is actually no tension with the
SCA because the Act separately provides for access with a warrant—see Carpenter, 819 F.3d
at 897 (Stranch, J., concurring).
85 Reply Brief in Opposition at 1, Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
86 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact
-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/RXE4-LF6H].
87 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889–90 (“Here, one might say that society itself—in the form of
its elected representatives in Congress—has already struck a balance that it thinks reasonable.”).
88 See id. at 887 (discussing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)).
89 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
90 Id. at 288.
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Courts should be extremely cautious of over-relying on legislative determina-
tions when an after-arising technology is at issue. It is one thing to decide that the
plain language of a statute continues to control even changed circumstances, at least
absent absurd consequences.91 It is quite another to infer a legislative purpose from
that language that never could have been (because the technology at issue did not
yet exist in meaningful form), and then apply that mythical purpose to interpret the
foundational rights of our Constitution.92
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE?
In order to appreciate the significance of Carpenter, it helps to identify the law
enforcement and private interests in location surveillance. For law enforcement,
there are at least two. One, as in Carpenter itself, the government has an interest in
solving past crime.93 This would seem to require, for the most part, historic location
information: by showing that Carpenter and his brother were near the crimes during
their commission, the government proves they might be the perpetrators.94 However,
this requires that such historic data exist. Therefore, in order to solve past crime, the
government has an interest in someone conducting prospective tracking and retain-
ing that data.
Two, the government has an interest in preventing future crime,95 which itself
has at least two variants. First, if persons know they are subject to surveillance, they
might decide not to commit crime—a generalized deterrence.96 This is not, as the
91 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527–30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing textualism allows avoidance of absurd results).
92 This is not to say that one cannot smartly attempt to translate the concerns of one time
into the facts of another. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the
Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1451, 1463 (2005) (“I seek . . . to offer the piece of the puzzle that is missing
in our Fourth Amendment universe: how would the Framers have written the Fourth Amend-
ment if they could have foreseen modern police methods?”). It is merely to urge that such
an enterprise requires real intellectual work, not facile claims of equivalence.
93 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
94 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016).
95 See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228.
96 Even a mere reminder of the potential for being watched can modify behavior. See
Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting,
2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412–13 (2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
1686213/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20170524214648/http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC1686213/] (finding that people contributed nearly three times as much for drinks
when an image of human eyes was displayed nearby); Terence C. Burnham & Brian Hare,
Engineering Human Cooperation: Does Involuntary Neural Activation Increase Public Goods
Contributions?, 18 HUM. NATURE 88, 99 (2007) (finding an increase in simulated public good
behavior when an image of a robot with human eyes was displayed); Max Ernest-Jones et al.,
Effects of Eye Images on Everyday Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment, 32 EVOLUTION
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Court has confusingly intimated, a special need that should get any sort of Fourth
Amendment pass.97 But it is a legitimate government concern, albeit one that, if un-
checked, would lead to an Orwellian state.98 Second, real-time surveillance might
permit government pre-crime intervention. If a sex offender enters a banned play-
ground, a domestic abuser enters a former victim’s neighborhood, or a neighborhood
experiences a ‘suspicious’ volume of activity, and that activity triggers a real-time
alert, perhaps officers can intervene before another crime can take place.
Thus, the government has a legitimate interest in both historic and prospective
location surveillance of all of us.99 This is not to say, of course, that certain types of
location information about certain persons would not be more valuable than others;
that is surely true, as when the government seeks a known fugitive.100 But those dif-
ferences are matters of degree not always easily assessed and, most importantly, they
are variable. In other words, it is not that government will desire only historic informa-
tion, or only prospective information (whether conveyed in real time or in chunks),
or only information of a certain granularity (precision). At least some of the time,
the government will want it all—type A in this instance and type B in that—and,
& HUM. BEHAV. 172, 176 (2011) (finding that people littered half as often when an image
of human eyes was displayed nearby); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (recognizing the internal sig-
nificance of feeling watched).
97 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (“Here, we assume that
the searches authorized by [the hotel registry ordinance] serve a ‘special need’ other than con-
ducting criminal investigations: They ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement,
which in turn deters criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”). This odd claim has
had perverse consequences in other litigation. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 939–40
(7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., concurring in the judgment) (considering lifetime GPS monitoring
of a sex offender to constitute a special need because it was not intended to solve a particular
crime). Databasing information in order to discourage new crime can, of course, be distin-
guished from punishing discovered crime to discourage new crime. But neither should be
considered a special need. Otherwise, police could randomly enter homes and claim the
‘special need’ of deterring crimes that might otherwise be committed therein—that too would
discourage crime, as would the hated general warrants of our founding era.
98 It is, after all, in the second paragraph of Nineteen Eighty-Four that the reader is intro-
duced to the posters of Big Brother:
At one end of [the hallway] a colored poster, too large for indoor display,
had been tacked to the wall. It depicted simply an enormous face, more
than a meter wide: the face of a man of about forty-five, with a heavy
black mustache and ruggedly handsome features. . . . On each landing,
opposite the lift shaft, the poster with the enormous face gazed from
the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived that the
eyes follow you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
YOU, the caption beneath it ran.
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3 (1949).
99 See Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines, supra note 53, at 942–43.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 866 F.3d 605, 606–07 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing use
of a mobile phone ‘ping’ order to locate a fugitive).
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therefore, its actors will logically seek out what exists, as well as attempt to ensure
that such information will exist. This is, conceptually, why the National Security
Agency was creating a telephone metadata ‘time machine,’101 and the utility of a
location surveillance time machine follows from the same logic. In the words of CIA
CTO Ira “Gus” Hunt,
[T]he value of any piece of information is only known when you
can connect it with something else which arrives at a future
point in time. And if you throw away, in our world, information
because you didn’t think it had any value, or you chose not to
bring in or collect information because [it] didn’t match what
you thought your needs were at that moment in time, you won’t
have information to connect together as new information and
new events emerge in the world. . . . [W]e fundamentally try to
collect everything and hang onto it forever.102
In other words, in the absence of acquisition and storage costs, and in the
absence of liberty concerns and associated economic costs, a government should
ensure—via some means—ubiquitous location information. Thus, where technolo-
gies and related social norms eliminate, or even seriously lessen, the acquisition and
storage costs, the only logical restraint on government location tracking is concern
for liberty. This should remain a most significant constraint, because such liberty
concerns are fundamental.103 They should be of constitutional magnitude, and the
most logical place to situate them is within the Fourth Amendment, as well as in the
First, which protects the freedoms of speech and association.104 Thus—and this seems
amply supported by the opinions in United States v. Jones105—there should be some
Fourth Amendment limitation on location surveillance.
The next question is whether that constitutional limitation should apply to only
certain manners of government acquisition. In part, it should. As I have written
101 See Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines, supra note 53, at 940–43 (de-
scribing the NSA telephony metadata program as a logical, albeit unlawful, “Fourth Amendment
time machine”).
102 Ira “Gus” Hunt, CIA Chief Technology Officer, Address at Gigaom Structure Data
Event (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUPd2uMiXXg (at 20:34).
103 See Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines, supra note 53, at 954–60 (gathering
sources explaining the consequences of lacking information privacy). See generally Alex
Kozinski & Mihailis E. Diamantis, An Eerie Feeling of Déjà Vu: From Soviet Snitches to
Angry Birds, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 420 (David Gray &
Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
104 The First Amendment provides as follows: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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elsewhere, “It would be devastating to legitimate law enforcement, and even downright
silly, if a police officer had to get a court order before looking at a person and thereby
determining his or her location.”106 But I cannot discern why the constitutional
restriction would apply only to location directly measured by law enforcement, as
opposed to location measured in the first instance by a third party. If the government
has legitimate reason to acquire such information—which we have established it
does—and if the cost of acquisition is eliminated—which we are certainly trending
towards—then why would any government care which manner of acquisition is used?
In other words, if manners A, B, and C are available and each costless, I would think
agents would and should arbitrarily choose among them. If manner A is legally
restricted, and manner B is fiscally expensive, but manner C is neither, I would think
agents would and should overwhelmingly choose manner C. Naturally, then, any
system of meaningful regulation must include manner C.
Perhaps manner A—a legally restricted acquisition—consists of the government
forcibly collaring an individual with a device that will report real-time location
information. Remarkably, some states have required certain individuals to wear such
a device for the rest of their lives without requiring any individualized determination
of government need nor restricting what can be done with the gathered informa-
tion.107 Thankfully, the Supreme Court has recognized this to constitute a Fourth
Amendment search,108 and therefore lower courts are considering reasonableness,
albeit too often in a dismissive manner.109 What is important for our purposes is that,
106 Henderson, Location Surveillance After Jones, supra note 8, at 832 (thus suggesting
no legal restraint on less than twenty-four hours of such surveillance); see also Blitz et al.,
supra note 55, at 68–72, 74–77 (defending a Fourth Amendment public disclosure doctrine).
107 See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2016).
108 See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015).
109 See, e.g., Belleau, 811 F.3d at 934–35 (“The focus must moreover be on the incre-
mental effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiff’s privacy, and that effect is slight given
the decision by Wisconsin—which he does not challenge—to make sex offenders’ criminal
records and home addresses public.”). This is a remarkable claim, asserting there is little
privacy difference between home address, on the one hand, and location at every point in
time, on the other. But Judge Posner did not stop there: “The additional loss from the fact
that occasionally his trouser leg hitches up and reveals an anklet monitor that may cause
someone who spots it to guess that this is a person who has committed a sex crime must be
slight.” Id. at 935. I cannot imagine how the effect of such a scarlet letter would be “slight”—the
collaring itself is significantly invasive of human dignity—nor do I think the judge is correct
to think one has an interest only in wearing “trouser[s],” as opposed to shorts or a bathing
suit or, at times, nothing at all. Posner continued with this odd claim: “It’s untrue that the GPS
device burdens liberty by its continuous surveillance of the offender’s activities; it just iden-
tifies locations; it doesn’t reveal what the wearer of the device is doing at any of the locations.”
Id. at 936 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Posner closed his opinion with this coup de grâce:
To return to our traffic analogy briefly: no one thinks that a posted
speed limit is a form of punishment. It is a punishment trigger if the
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in this instance, law enforcement itself gathers the location information by way of
a bodily contact.
Perhaps manner B—a fiscally expensive acquisition—consists of law enforce-
ment tracking an individual with a high-altitude autonomous drone that employs
facial, gait, and other recognition technologies and reports real-time location infor-
mation.110 There are differences in scenarios A and B, and they might have Fourth
Amendment and due process relevance. For example, the tracking in the first scenario
is demeaning and stigmatizing, while perhaps that in the second is not, at least in the
same manner or degree. But as for the intrusion into one’s person based upon no longer
having any location privacy, the two differ not at all.
Manner C—neither legally nor fiscally restricted—might be, according to the
Sixth Circuit in Carpenter, when a third party initially gathers, but does not disclose
or share, this same location information.111 Indeed, say the third party guarantees such
use restrictions, contractually binding itself to using, after the fact, only anonymized,
aggregated location data and only in order to improve the quality of its underlying
services.112 The tracking might occur via a device tethered to or always carried by
the person, or via our hypothesized autonomous drone (perhaps the third party offers
a security service that intercedes only in the event of an emergency). If another party
accesses this location information, either in historic chunks or in real time, then as
for the intrusion into the tracked person’s security based on lesser location privacy,
it seems identical to that of manners A and B. It matters not—or at least not
much—that in one instance the data arrives in daily or weekly chunks, while in
another it comes by-the-minute. Nor does it matter whose device is recording and
how. What matters is that the person will respond to no longer having any location
privacy, chilling her expressive and associational autonomy.
police catch you violating the speed limit, but police are not required
to obtain a warrant before stopping a speeding car. The anklet monitor
law is the same: it tells the plaintiff—if you commit another sex offense,
you’ll be caught and punished, because we know exactly where you are
at every minute of every day.
Id. at 938. How anyone could think lifetime GPS monitoring of a particular individual can
be meaningfully compared to a speed limit is beyond me. It was also seemingly beyond
Posner’s colleague, Judge Flaum, who concurred only in the judgment. See id. (“The
challenge presented by this appeal requires addressing substantial competing interests: an
individual’s right to privacy from government monitoring, on the one hand, and the state’s
interest in protecting children from sexual abuse, on the other.” (emphasis added)).
110 We will assume, for our purposes, a bit of technology that does not yet exist but soon
will, including robust biometric recognition from all angles and inflight recharging in order
to permit the continuous monitoring.
111 819 F.3d 880, 887–89 (6th Cir. 2016).
112 This private-party limitation is important. If the information is readily accessed by
other persons, then agents of law enforcement need not alone “shield their eyes.” California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); see Blitz et al., supra note 55, at 68–72, 74–77.
2017] CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 515
In other words, in impact, Carpenter is not merely a case about CSLI. If there
is no constitutional limit to the historic location information that law enforcement
can obtain via third-party records, then there is effectively no constitutional limit to
law enforcement location surveillance. This would be a startling development in a
world that has developed technologies that not only can routinely track and store
location, but that increasingly do.
III. IS IT A SEARCH?
Based upon the argument above, I certainly consider law enforcement access to
third-party records containing longer term CSLI to constitute a Fourth Amendment
search. It does not follow that law enforcement are prohibited from such access, of
course, or even that such access requires a certain justification procedure—that is
a second consideration of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. But the access should
constitute a search. This can be seen in several ways.
First, according to the commonplace dictionary definition—both at the founding
and today—acquiring records and looking through them constitutes a ‘search.’113
Although the Court has adopted such a straightforward interpretation of seizure,114
it has only flirted with the concept for search,115 and I do not expect the Court to
jettison the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry. Therefore, while I continue
to favor a dictionary definition of search that leaves most all of the work to reason-
ableness, I will not belabor it here.
Instead, in the absence of a physical intrusion to a protected interest, the Court
has established reasonable expectation of privacy as the search trigger.116 I am con-
fident that as an empirical matter, people expect their longer term CSLI information
to be kept confidential, and that as a normative matter, it is essential to a free people
that the government not have unfettered access to citizen location, at least unless
such information otherwise becomes universally accessible.
The first claim is of course one for which data must be gathered. Fortunately,
several studies of increasing sophistication are available, and they demonstrate an
expectation of privacy in longer term CSLI.117 In 2015, an empirical study focusing
113 See Search, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/search
[https://perma.cc/Q7G9-DKPT] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (“to look into or over carefully
or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something”). Merriam Webster also includes
as a definition “to read thoroughly,” as in to “search land titles.” Id.; see also Henderson,
Nothing New, supra note 43, at 544–46 (agreeing with Akhil Amar and others that the Court
should use a dictionary definition of ‘search’); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 158–60 (2017) (making a sophisticated argument for the same).
114 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (using an 1828 definition of seizure).
115 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (urging an 1828 definition of
search).
116 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012); id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment).
117 See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy:
Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2009) (reporting on an
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on the third party doctrine concluded that “individuals have far higher expectations
of privacy than courts have recognized and that contrary to the perceptions of the
courts, privacy expectations are not founded on whether or not information is kept
completely secret.”118 Indeed, the majority of study participants favored a warrant
requirement for law enforcement access to CSLI.119 A more recent study similarly
found that third party doctrine scenarios “were treated by our survey respondents as
more intrusive than [scenarios] the [Supreme] Court considers the most intrusive of
privacy.”120 In particular, survey respondents considered access to seven months of
CSLI as equally invasive to the search of one’s bedroom.121
While there are always criticisms to be made of any empirical study, or at least
limitations therein, surely this recent work provides a better sense of what Americans
expect than the guess of any professor or judge—or of nine judges, as the case may
be. As for the impact of the amount of information (e.g., the duration of CSLI), there
empirical study into the question of Fourth Amendment search); Bernard Chao et al., Why
Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924744)
(same); Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2011)
(same); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205 [hereinafter Kugler
& Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations] (same); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft avail-
able at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922777) [hereinafter Kugler
& Strahilevitz, The Myth] (same); Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Tech-
nologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475 (2012) (same);
Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of
Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015) (same); Christopher Slobogin,
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008) (same);
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002) (reporting on another such study); Christopher Slobogin
& Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by
Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (reporting on a first-of-its-kind empirical study into the
question of Fourth Amendment search); Alisa Smith et al., An Empirical Examination of
Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age of GPS, Cell Phone Towers, & Drones,
26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 111 (2016) (same). The Pew Research Center also gathers relevant
data on Americans’ perceptions. See, e.g., Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden
America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09
/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/K5NJ-Z5E7]; Kathryn Zickuhr, Location-
Based Services, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/12
/location-based-services/ [https://perma.cc/E7NG-FRQS].
118 Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 117, at 22.
119 Id. at 52–53.
120 Chao et al., supra note 117 (manuscript at 5) (emphasis added); see also id. (manu-
script at 57 tbl.4).
121 Id. (manuscript at 47–48).
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is, counter to my intuitions, reason to question whether Americans react to this vari-
able.122 Nonetheless, because there is reason for the Court to be cautious in expounding
Fourth Amendment rights—more on this below—I would not disfavor a holding ex-
pressly limited to longer term CSLI acquisition like that at issue in the Carpenter case.
As for the normative assertion—that in a relatively free society the government
should not have unfettered access to citizen location—firstly, I agree with Justice
Harlan that the Fourth Amendment must have a normative backstop.123 While there
might be reasoned argument upon any such normative claim, when it comes to location
surveillance, there seems ample support in everything from classic dystopian literature
to efforts of historic totalitarian regimes to the Court opinions in Jones.124 And when
considering the normative impact of location surveillance, it is important to keep in
mind that location is highly predictable, such that in accessing historic data, law
enforcement can also see into the future.125
While the analysis above—even the loose normative hand-waving—seems more
than adequate to me, we have not yet considered the Fourth Amendment text. It pro-
tects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches.”126 Five Justices have recognized that longer
term government location tracking can constitute a search regardless of the lack of any
physical intrusion,127 which textually must then interfere with the constitutionally
122 See generally Kugler & Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations, supra note 117, at 209
(finding that the duration of vehicle GPS tracking did not affect its perceived intrusiveness);
Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 117, at 53 (same). On the other hand, there is reason to think
Americans’ privacy expectations are more robust than many have feared or claimed. See gen-
erally Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth, supra note 117 (finding that the Supreme Court’s cell
phone search decision in Riley had no lasting impact upon relevant privacy expectations).
123 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Since
it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as
judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of sad-
dling them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks of
the [government surveillance] without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.”).
124 See GRAY, supra note 113, at 1–17 (making some of these connections).
125 See Chaoming Song et al., Limits of Predictability in Human Mobility, 327 SCIENCE
1018, 1021 (2010) (finding that location based upon mobile phone data is 93% predictable).
Apparently, I am not the only creature of habit. See also Dr Seldon, I Presume, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 23, 2013, at 76 (discussing this research).
126 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an argument that the Court has too often neglected this
text, see GRAY, supra note 113, at 134–72.
127 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
Justice Alito’s concurrence, saying that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy”); id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment). No Justice argued otherwise; the remaining four merely thought it unnecessary
to decide in the case before the Court. See id. at 412–13 (majority opinion) (“We may have
to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for
rushing forward to resolve them here.”).
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protected security in our persons. This seems right. The Court has also held that even
short-term location tracking within a home constitutes a search,128 while equivalent
tracking external to the home does not.129 This, then, must textually depend upon the
constitutionally protected security in our houses. This too seems right—law enforce-
ment officers physically present on public thoroughfares need not shield their eyes,
but our movements within our home are not similarly shared. And the Court has held
that government location tracking that physically intrudes upon a vehicle constitutes
a search, interfering with the constitutionally protected security in our effects.130
The final textually protected interest is in our papers, and it was an interest dear
to the Framers.131 I submit that our papers are today often held in trust by third parties,132
as the Court in Riley seemed to appreciate.133 If there is not protection for such third-
party papers, then we risk no Fourth Amendment protection for modern communica-
tions, including emails,134 and for modern data storage, including cloud computing.
That is a constitutional risk we should not take.
Moreover, even a first-party-only limitation for papers would not doom Fourth
Amendment protection.135 As I argued in the previous Part, government access to such
private information has the same—or at least a very similar—effect on the security in
our persons as does direct government tracking. And, as just mentioned, five Justices
in Jones are on record effectively rejecting the notion that the security in our “persons”
covers only physical intrusions. And wisely so, lest there be no Fourth Amendment
restraint on government drone tracking and other such emerging technologies.136
128 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716–18 (1984).
129 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
130 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term
is used in the [Fourth] Amendment. We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS
device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a ‘search.’” (internal citation omitted)).
131 See Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Pri-
vate “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
49, 61–83 (2013).
132 See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 611 (2015) (arguing that some third parties should be treated as “information fiduciaries”
from which any government access should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment).
133 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
134 Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth
Amendment protects email content residing with a third-party provider).
135 For such an argued limitation, see Orin Kerr, How Should an Originalist Rule in the
Fourth Amendment Cell-Site Case?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/13/how-should-an
-originalist-rule-in-the-fourth-amendment-cell-site-case/?utm_term=.8840006a40a3 [https://
perma.cc/MMJ3-7TW3] (arguing that only certain information held by a third party can
constitute a customer’s papers).
136 For an overview of how the Fourth Amendment should apply to drone flight, see Blitz
et al., supra note 55.
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So, however one spins it, law enforcement accessing generally inaccessible
third-party documents containing longer term location information and looking
through them in order to learn something should constitute a Fourth Amendment
search. This will mean that the third party doctrine as a monolithic, sharp rule will
be no more. The Court would replace the anachronistic bright-line rule just as it has
replaced other Fourth Amendment doctrines that did not stand the test of time.137 It
need not mean that provision of information to third parties is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment analysis. As recognized in the ABA Standards relating to law enforcement
access to such information, sharing can impact how private is the information and
thus what restraint law enforcement access should require in order to be reasonable,138
the step to which I now turn.
IV. IS IT REASONABLE?
Reasonableness is designedly ambiguous—and therefore subject to court inter-
pretation—allowing the constitutional regulation of search and seizure to withstand
centuries of technological and sociological change. Only some searches and seizures
require a warrant to satisfy this threshold, including those that required a warrant at
the founding.139
137 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (applying automobile exception to all
containers in cars, overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)); Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (eliminating separate elements of veracity and basis of knowledge in
probable cause, overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969)); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (embracing automobile ex-
ception for containers in cars, overruling Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981)); United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (eliminating automatic standing, overruling Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (eliminating
whole-home search incident to arrest, overruling Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)); Camara v. Mun. Court of City
& Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment to noncriminal searches
but diluting probable cause for administrative searches, overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (protecting telephones against
non-trespassory interception, overruling, inter alia, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928)); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (permitting seizure of
mere evidence, overruling Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule against the states, overruling Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949)); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (rejecting then-relevant
“silver platter doctrine,” overruling Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949)). There are
also several relatively recent cases in which the Court claimed no overruling but in which
many see one. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (permitting Fourth Amendment
facial challenges despite Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332 (2009) (limiting automobile searches incident to lawful arrest despite New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454 (1981)); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (permitting arrest on probable
cause of non-arrestable offense despite United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
138 ABA LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 71, Standard 25-4.1(a) at 57–59.
139 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482–84 (2014).
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The Founders had private papers, and their security as against the government
was their utmost concern.140 But those papers did not typically reside with third
parties. Nor were there telephones that allowed instantaneous private communica-
tion at a distance, let alone phones—not to mention powerful computers—that are
ubiquitously carried and can be used at most all times, but which thereby inciden-
tally track and log location. Lacking such “precise guidance from the founding era,”
the Court “generally determine[s] whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”141
The Carpenter facts themselves demonstrate the legitimate governmental interest
in cell site location, as do the many other cases in which such evidence is used. Several
years ago, a public defender commented that, “In every major case in Los Angeles, they
use cell-tower information, . . . It’s like fingerprints, it’s that common.”142 It is unlikely
that investigatory use has decreased since then, although hopefully there has been an
increased attention to scientific accuracy.143 As for the corresponding intrusion into
privacy by acquiring large amounts of location information, the Supreme Court recog-
nized its significance in Jones and Riley, albeit for the more precise GPS.144
As for balancing these interests, the Court has acknowledged that achieving the
appropriate constitutional balance is especially difficult when technologies are ad-
vancing as quickly as they are today.145 Thus, four justices have urged that “the best
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative”—citing the work of Orin Kerr—
because “[a] legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to
draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive
way.”146 Indeed, Justice Alito more recently suggested that he would change a previous
140 See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807, 817–18 (K.B.) (permitting officers
to “read over, pry[ ] into, and examine[ ] all the private papers . . . of the plaintiff” “would
destroy all the comforts of society; for papers are often the dearest property a man can have.”);
see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“Entick v. Carrington is a case we
have described as a monument of English freedom undoubtedly familiar to every American
statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate
expression of constitutional law with regard to search and seizure.” (internal citation and quota-
tion marks omitted)); Dripps, supra note 131, at 61–83 (artfully describing this legal landscape).
141 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142 Jackman, Experts Say, supra note 19 (statement of Jennifer Friedman, Chief of Foren-
sics for the Los Angeles County Public Defender).
143 See id.
144 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
145 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759–60 (2010).
146 Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Orin S. Kerr,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06 (2004)); see also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amend-
ment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2010) (“In an ideal world, government informa-
tion gathering would be regulated by a comprehensive statutory regime. Courts would analyze
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holding if a different, after-enacted and comprehensive legislative solution appeared
reasonable.147 I too have argued that “[w]e require legislative differential regulation,
by which I mean a hierarchy of regulation proportional to privacy, yet responsive
to law enforcement needs, subject to a constitutional backstop.”148 And I have
attempted to articulate at least portions of what could become a statutory solution.149
So, both state legislatures and Congress should step up to the plate and compre-
hensively regulate not only law enforcement access to location information, but also
to other types of information. In doing so, they can look to thoughtful guides estab-
lished by the American Bar Association and others.150 Until legislatures fulfill that
responsibility, however, “[t]he best that [courts] can do . . . is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine” to decide the cases before them.151 This is a role courts cannot
abdicate. And as Kiel Brennan-Marquez and I have argued, the Supreme Court’s recent
opinion in Birchfield v. North Dakota152 “can be read as a re-affirmation of a funda-
mental principle: when privacy and liberty norms are in flux, as they are given recent
and rapid technological change, police should seek the assistance of legislatures in
governing investigatory methods, and they must seek the approval of courts.”153 I
certainly believe that law enforcement should be required to seek judicial approval
before accessing longer term CSLI.154
whether the rules in this statutory regime met basic Fourth Amendment principles rather than
craft the rules themselves. A pronouncement as short and vague as the Fourth Amendment
best serves as a guidepost to evaluate rules, rather than as a source of those rules.”).
147 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“While I agree
with the holding of the Court, I would reconsider the question presented here if either
Congress or state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate needs of law enforcement and
the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions
based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.”).
148 Henderson, Location Surveillance After Jones, supra note 8, at 808.
149 See id. at 815–21, 823–25, 826–35; Henderson, Cell Tower Dumps, supra note 52, at
47–57. See also generally Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones
in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2012) (articulating another such solution).
150 See ABA LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 71.
151 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Solove, supra
note 146, at 1515.
152 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166–67, 2168–69, 2186–87 (2016) (permitting a breathalyzer as a
routine incident of a DUI arrest but not a blood draw).
153 Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, AM.
CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2955077) (internal citation omitted).
154 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law en-
forcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”).
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A court need not, however, reach out to decide more than is before it, and while
Supreme Court guidance to police is important, providing untimely guidance can
have significant negative consequences. As the Court, per curiam, recently noted,
“[t]his Court, after all, is one of review, not of first view.”155 Justice Neil Gorsuch
cautioned the same in his first concurrence, counseling that “[t]his Court often speaks
most wisely when it speaks last.”156 Had the Court not embraced unnecessarily expan-
sive dicta in Miller,157 perhaps lower courts and legislatures might have done more
over the years to thoughtfully regulate law enforcement access to varying types of
third-party information. By the same token, such organic development is unlikely to
occur when courts entirely avoid merits decisions by invoking reasonable reliance,
thereby speaking only to the suppression remedy and not to the underlying Fourth
Amendment right.158 There is a world of difference between incremental develop-
ment and stagnation, and, in the case of CSLI, Congress in particular has recognized
this issue for the better part of a decade but has done nothing in response.159
So, what to do in Carpenter, in which agents obtained 127 days of cell site location
information?160 The Court could hold such access requires a warrant or a lesser court
order, the Court could remand the issue for the Sixth Circuit to consider in the first
instance, or the Court could hold—even assuming a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion—there was reasonable reliance on a facially valid statute and thus the evidence
should not be suppressed.161
155 Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (quoting Expressions Hair Design
v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1932 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justice Gorsuch continued as follows:
Respectfully, it seems to me at least reasonably possible that the crucible
of adversarial testing on which we usually depend, along with the experi-
ence of our thoughtful colleagues on the district and circuit benches,
could yield insights (or reveal pitfalls) we cannot muster guided only
by our own lights. So while I agree with the Court that the parties will
need guidance about the details of the statute’s causation requirement,
I have no doubt that the Court of Appeals, with aid of briefing from the
parties, can supply that on remand. Other circuits may improve that
guidance over time too. And eventually we can bless the best of it.
Id. at 1931–32 (internal citation omitted).
157 See supra Section I.C.1.
158 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 245–49 (2011) (discussing but dismissing
concerns of Fourth Amendment ossification via reasonable reliance upon court precedent);
see, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concur-
ring in the judgment on Fourth Amendment issue); Brief for the United States in Opposition
at 10, 29–31, Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-
402).
159 See Location Based Technologies Hearing, supra note 16 (taking place in 2010).
160 819 F.3d at 886.
161 See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987) (establishing an “exception to the exclu-
sionary rule . . . when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute . . . ultimately
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I would personally be comfortable with a warrant requirement vaguely applying
to ‘longer term’ CSLI acquisition, recognizing that 127 days is longer term. Any-
thing more precise—establishing a particular duration threshold—seems premature
and inconsistent with the Court’s recent more cautious approach. While sometimes
it makes sense for the Court to articulate at least approximate hour or day thresholds
in interpreting the federal Constitution, it would seem better to avoid them when
possible, at least in the first instance.
For example, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,162 the Court held that judicial
determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours is expected in order to
constitute the ‘prompt’ review required for an arrestee remaining in custody.163 But
not only did that remain a somewhat fluid trigger,164 most importantly, the holding
came sixteen years after the Court first required ‘prompt’ judicial determination, and
only then because there remained significant lower court confusion.165 When spe-
cific durations are declared spontaneously, like Maryland v. Shatzer’s fourteen-day
rule in the context of invocation of Miranda rights in custody,166 they are less likely
to be carefully considered and correspondingly less likely to be well received.167
So, again, the Court would be well within its better norms to declare a warrant
requirement for ‘longer term’ CSLI acquisition that includes—but is not defined
by—a period of 127 days. But is it clear that a reasonable-suspicion court order
could not reasonably obtain that information, especially if that access restraint were
accompanied by restrictions upon information use?168 If that too is reasonable, the
Court could instead require what is often interpreted to be necessary under the
Stored Communications Act. To be clear, this would not be a deferential finding
since, as discussed above, that Act was not written with this information in mind.169
It would be an independent decision that such a court order adequately balances the
governmental investigatory needs with citizens’ liberty and privacy interests.
found to violate the Fourth Amendment”).
162 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
163 Id. at 56.
164 Id. at 56–57 (acknowledging the varied circumstances of criminal investigation and
therefore recognizing both that a delay of less than forty-eight hours could be too long and
that a delay of more than forty-eight hours could, in extraordinary circumstances, be con-
stitutionally acceptable).
165 See id. at 55–56 (explaining lingering confusion); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
124–25 (1975) (requiring “prompt” determination). In Gerstein, Justice Stewart wrote sepa-
rately to urge caution regarding judicial overreach. 420 U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(arguing against dicta declaring more than is necessary to decide the case at hand).
166 Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (holding an in-custody invocation retains
significance through fourteen days of a break in custody).
167 See id. at 119–20 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 120–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
168 See Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines, supra note 53, at 960–63 (explain-
ing use restrictions).
169 See supra Section I.C.3.
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Thus, perhaps even more discretion is the better part of valor. In Grady v. North
Carolina,170 the Court unanimously held that attaching a GPS device to a person in
order to track location is a search, leaving to lower courts in the first instance what
the Fourth Amendment restraints might be.171 In Jones, five Justices proposed that
“longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses” constitutes a search,172
again leaving reasonableness to lower courts in the first instance.173 In Carpenter,
the Sixth Circuit held that the government acquisition of CSLI did not constitute a
search.174 If the high court reverses merely this holding, the Sixth Circuit, other courts,
and hopefully legislatures can consider the particular demands of reasonableness in
the first instance.
V. POTENTIAL CONCERNS
The doctrine can thus develop in time, with Carpenter presenting the opportu-
nity to put the Fourth Amendment on the right path. Before starting down any path,
of course, one wants to be confident it presents no insurmountable obstacles. Here
I briefly consider two—the compatibility of multiple parties sharing Fourth Amend-
ment rights and so-called ‘mosaic’ concerns—before briefly concluding with some
thoughts on the importance of state constitutions in the Fourth Amendment analysis.
A. Third-Party Consent
If a customer retains Fourth Amendment rights in information held by another,
how does that mesh with the rights of that third party? After all, although I retain
Fourth Amendment rights in a letter sent to my mother while that letter is in transit,175
it would seem odd if I could constitutionally restrain her from providing that letter
to law enforcement.176 As far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, upon receipt,
170 135 S. Ct 1368 (2015).
171 See id. at 1371.
172 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 430 n.11 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In the courts below the Govern-
ment did not argue, and has not argued here, that the Fourth Amendment does not impose
these precise restrictions and that the violation of these restrictions does not demand the
suppression of evidence obtained using the tracking device. Because it was not raised, that
question is not before us.” (internal citations omitted)).
174 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, we hold that
the government’s collection of business records containing cell-site data was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).
175 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
176 A contrary rule in this circumstance would seem odd, but is not legally impracticable—
the sender retains a copyright in the letter that, at least in theory, continues to restrict what
the recipient may do with the letter. For a skeptical view of this law, see Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Privacy, Copyright, and Letters, 3 ELON L. REV. 161 (2012).
2017] CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 525
the letter is hers. She can stand upon her own rights, retaining the letter in her home
or purse and requiring a warrant—or maybe a subpoena—to access it.177 Or, she can
choose to waive those rights, selling me out. Knowing what is in that letter is now
mom’s life too, and she should be free to share it, including with the government.
Imagine I am a customer of Telecommunications World (TW), and as part of
providing contracted-for services, TW gathers information about my activities. And
say that law enforcement, for its own reasons, would like to have a look at that
information. Post-Carpenter, if that information is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement, what happens? Sometimes, either for reasons of genuine
principle, economic interest, public relations, or some combination thereof, TW will
also want to insist upon the warrant—witness the ‘Snowden effect.’178 So, TW points
out the legal restriction and awaits any court order;179 if law enforcement does not
like that, it can contact me—the customer—and request my voluntary consent.
Other times, however, TW will be happy to disclose the information. After all,
it is not the company’s technology, nor the privacy of its board members or employees,
that is at issue. And, again for reasons of genuine principle, economic interest (the
government is an important customer or regulator), or public relations, the company
might like to play nice with police. In such a case, as between me and TW, whose
desire prevails?180
In a sense, this situation is well-known to the Fourth Amendment under the
doctrine of common authority. In most situations, one with common authority over
information can choose to consent to requested law enforcement access, regardless
177 For an argument that subpoenas, including grand jury subpoenas, should not get un-
regulated access to all private documents, see Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson,
Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195
(2014).
178 See Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Internet Firms Step Up Efforts to Stop Spying, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/technology/internet-firms-step
-up-efforts-to-stop-spying.html (describing a ‘Snowden effect’ in companies’ increased atten-
tion to customer privacy).
179 Orin Kerr has raised a concern that a third party like TW might not be permitted to
require the warrant if its records are typically accessible under a lower legal threshold. See
Orin Kerr, Third Party Rights and the Carpenter Cell-Site Case, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy
/wp/2017/06/15/third-party-rights-and-the-carpenter-cell-site-case [https://perma.cc/PRY6
-WC2S]. But that seems wrong. Anytime different types of records are commingled, each
having a different legal access restraint, government access to the whole should require the
highest relevant restraint. And many third parties—attorneys, psychologists, hospitals, banks,
etc.—should be well acquainted with considering not only their own rights in information
but also the rights of their customers, at least in some contexts. Statutes have successfully
added to these traditional parties, and other institutions should be able to learn to follow suit.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (restricting voluntary disclosure by telecommunications
and internet providers).
180 Kerr also raises this concern. See Kerr, supra note 179.
526 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:495
of what others enjoying the same authority might desire.181 Although a line employee
at TW likely would not share such ‘common authority,’ surely, it seems somebody at
TW must. However, common authority claimed in this greater sense is not always
effective. For example, a physically present co-tenant who makes a threshold ob-
jection to home entry renders the consent of other co-tenants ineffective as against
her.182 More importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinction when one
of the actors is a business.
Despite businesses enjoying certain aspects of some constitutional rights,183 they
do not have a human autonomy interest in choosing to share information with law
enforcement.184 Thus, even if an apartment manager or hotel employee is privileged
to enter a (temporary) home, she is not thereby privileged to permit a law enforce-
ment desire to join.185 In the words of the Court, in such a situation “no common
authority could sensibly be suspected,” for “[a] person on the scene who identifies
himself, say, as a landlord or a hotel manager calls up no customary understanding
of authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant.”186 In other
words, this is common sense: in such situations, we don’t care that the businesses
would like to share because it is not theirs to give. Surely nobody thinks that a Bank
of America employee can consent to the access of a safety deposit box or that a
Microsoft employee can consent to the access of customer emails.187 I am not sure
why anyone would—or should—think otherwise as to Verizon with respect to my
location information. Once a legislature or court has announced third-party rights
in information types, the norms naturally follow, and both the company and the
police can be expected to know of them and to follow them.
181 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Indeed, so long as police reason-
ably believe the consenting individual had common authority, that consent is effective. See
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
182 Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1133–34 (2014); Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
183 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that a federal statute barring
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First
Amendment).
184 See Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J.
139, 185–86 (2005) (“Human information sources, such as [a] sexual partner, should have
a right to decide what to do with the information they possess; in such cases, the subject’s
privacy interest is outweighed by the source’s autonomy interest. When the third party is an
impersonal record-holder, on the other hand, concerns about denigrating ‘personhood’ through
limitations on when information may be revealed are non-existent.” (internal citations
omitted)); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou-
bling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049 (2000) (considering the First Amendment requirements and implications of information
privacy speech restrictions).
185 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel employee); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord).
186 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112.
187 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (restricting voluntary disclosure of emails).
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So, there is a critical difference between my mother holding ‘third-party informa-
tion’ in my letter—over the disclosure of which she has an underlying autonomy and
dignitary interest, a freedom to speak her mind—and a company like our imagined
TW holding customer information. Of course, things might be different if the infor-
mation relates to a TW employee, or if it directly impacts TW—say it is evidence of
hacking of its own servers. But these will not be the ordinary case. Instead, in a situation
like Carpenter, no company employee has even perused the requested information;
if it is to be turned over to law enforcement, it must first be gathered precisely—and
solely—for this purpose. Think of it this way: if law enforcement were to enter any
Verizon store or corporate office in America and request my location information,
nobody would be able to respond from personal knowledge because nobody would
know it.188 An employee would need to pull it from Verizon’s database.
Thus, in the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards relating to law
enforcement access to third-party records, the relevant consent is solely that of the
customer who is the focus of the record.189 Two categories of acquisition from institu-
tional third parties, however, are entirely carved out of the Standards’ scope.190 The
first is when an institutional third party “that is a victim of crime [is] disclosing infor-
mation that is evidence of that crime or that is otherwise intended to protect its rights
or property.”191 In that instance, the third party has a relevant self-interest, and existing
federal privacy statutes acknowledge such a distinction.192 The second exception is
when a third party “decid[es] of its own initiative and volition to provide information
to law enforcement,”193 meaning it was the private business—not law enforcement—
that initiated the specific contact leading to the records transfer.194 In such instance,
the third party’s action is genuinely private conduct that would seem unregulated by
the Bill of Rights just as it would be unregulated by criminal justice standards.
In short, there seems to be no reason that third-party businesses and law enforce-
ment cannot accommodate recognition of constitutional rights in certain third-party
information. If doing so were impossible, the same would seem to follow for
statutory rights, and that would seem a rather striking—and counterfactual—claim.
188 If this is not true, Verizon, we need to talk. Seriously, what is your obsession with me?
189 ABA LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 71, Standard 25-5.1 at 95–99. The “focus of
a record” is a defined term in order to differentiate, for example, the subscriber to which
calling records relate, on the one hand, from every person whose phone number is included
in those particular records, on the other. The subscriber is the “focus of [the] record.” See id.
Standard 25-1.1(c) at 29. There can of course be multiple such persons, as for a joint tele-
phone or bank account. See id. Standard 25-5.1(c) at 98–99.
190 Law enforcement access from someone who is not acting as an institutional third party
is entirely outside the Standards’ scope. See id. Standard 25-2.1(d) at 38–40.
191 Id. Standard 25-2.1(f )(i) at 41.
192 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2012) (articulating such a provider exception for
wiretap acquisitions); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2012) (articulating such a provider exception
for stored communications).
193 ABA LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 71, Standard 25-2.1(f )(ii) at 41.
194 See id. Standard 25-2.1(f )(ii) at 41–44.
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Not only do such statutes exist, but, as described below, some states have already
gone further, recognizing such constitutional protections.
B. Mosaics
Fourth Amendment rights in third-party information thus can be workable,
though—as we have already acknowledged—it is not easy to be confident in selecting
administrable lines in the first instance. Should law enforcement be able to obtain
twenty-four hours of data A on ground x, but need a warrant for anything more? Or
should the line be forty-eight hours, or a week? What about for data types B and C?
Legislatures, and then courts, have their work cut out for them.195
But are there concerns of administrability even after these lines are legally
declared?196 On the one hand, as I have pointed out elsewhere, there is nothing novel
in the constitutionality of law enforcement conduct depending upon the totality of
law enforcement behavior.197 This is true for such commonplace considerations as
whether police conduct constitutes a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion,198
whether police conduct constitutes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause,199 and
whether a suspect is in custody such that Miranda warnings are required.200 These
lines are not absolute: sometimes drawing a firearm will elevate a stop into a de facto
arrest and Miranda custody; other times it will be permissible as part of a limited
Terry stop.201 And sometimes constitutionality, or at least admissibility, depends upon
what other officers have done, such as the impact of an invocation of the Miranda
right to counsel in an unrelated interrogation.202
Nonetheless, while policing has always required some difficult determinations,
we should consider the practical impact upon a law enforcement officer if the legal
standard for access to CSLI is tiered according to duration. To make the example
concrete, say access to a week or more of CSLI requires a probable cause warrant,
195 As for records including both data types A and C, the legal restriction should be the
greater of the two individual restrictions. See id. Standard 25-4.2(a) at 20.
196 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311 (2012) (expressing concerns with any “mosaic” standard).
197 See Henderson, Location Surveillance After Jones, supra note 8, at 823–25. Much of the
following content is taken directly from this article, but for ease of reference it is repeated here.
198 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (asking “whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”
(citation omitted)).
199 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1979) (looking to movement, show
of authority, and duration in differentiating a de facto arrest from a Terry stop).
200 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440–42 (1984) (defining custody as when a
reasonable person would feel her freedom of movement had been curtailed to the degree
associated with a formal arrest).
201 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 224, 234–36 (1985) (holding that a deten-
tion constituted a Terry stop despite the drawing of a service revolver).
202 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–85 (1988) (holding invocation effective
as against a different officer unaware of that invocation).
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access to less than a week but more than twenty-four hours requires a lesser court
order, and access to twenty-four hours or less is permissible upon officer request.
For an officer wanting to obtain sixteen hours of such information, the path should
be clear. But does that officer first need to scour her files to make sure that no CSLI
was previously requested? And if ten hours of CSLI was previously obtained, does
that push her current request into the court-order tier? Does it matter whether that
previous request was for purposes of this same investigation or another one? Does
it matter whether it took place three weeks ago or three years ago? What if the
officer’s colleagues might have made such requests in their investigations? What
about the investigations of sister departments?
My solution has been to offer a “mildly mosaic” approach that does not typically
consider previous requests, but that permits some ultimate court review in order to
deter gaming of the system.203 We do not want an officer who desires forty-eight
hours of CSLI to request twenty-four of those hours, wait a day, and then request the
second twenty-four, all designed to avoid the requirement of a court order.204 On the
other hand, investigations are fluid, and a genuine new request should not be unduly
hampered. Whatever the specific solution, courts should thus ultimately review
access, probably considering whether the requests objectively appear designed to
avoid the legal restraints, thereby diminishing respect for the rule of law. Whether
such violations should lead to suppression of the evidence or to other sanctions (e.g.,
administrative discipline, civil penalties, and even criminal sanctions), should ideally
be left to legislatures in the first instance. For example, Pennsylvania has enacted a
novel provision regarding the abuse of wiretaps that might be superior to any remedy
involving suppression of the evidence.205
What is critical here is that, once again, while there will be good work to do,
recognition of constitutional rights in third-party information need not derail effective
police investigation.
C. State Constitutions
In closing, it is worth briefly emphasizing an obvious point: the federal Supreme
Court is supreme, but only in its sphere. A number of state supreme courts have
203 See Henderson, Location Surveillance After Jones, supra note 8, at 825.
204 This hypothetical can be analogized to banking anti-structuring law, which criminalizes
a customer breaking up a single cash transaction in order to evade financial institution re-
porting requirements. See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (examining
mens rea for those criminal provisions).
205 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5726(a) (2017) (“Any aggrieved person shall have the right
to bring an action in Commonwealth Court against any investigative or law enforcement
officer, public official or public employee seeking the officer’s, official’s or employee’s re-
moval from office or employment on the grounds that the officer, official or employee has
intentionally violated the provisions of this chapter. If the court shall conclude that such offi-
cer, official or employee has in fact intentionally violated the provisions of this chapter, the
court shall order the dismissal or removal from office of said officer, official or employee.”).
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taken their own path when interpreting their respective state constitutional analog
to the federal Fourth Amendment, including rejection of the federal third party
doctrine.206 And at least two have already done so with respect to cell site location
information in opinions which should be carefully considered by the United States
Supreme Court.207
The high court indeed has a tradition of considering such state jurisprudence in
making Fourth Amendment decisions.208 For example, in Payton v. New York,209 the
Court had to decide whether the Fourth Amendment allowed warrantless home entry
for purposes of arrest.210 The Court not only looked to state constitutional jurispru-
dence, but relied upon a trend of courts declaring such entry unconstitutional:
Only 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrantless entries
into the home to arrest, and there is an obvious declining trend.
Further, the strength of the trend is greater than the numbers alone
indicate. Seven state courts have recently held that warrantless
home arrests violate their respective State Constitutions. That is
significant because by invoking a state constitutional provision,
a state court immunizes its decision from review by this Court.
This heightened degree of immutability underscores the depth of
the principle underlying the result.211
A federal system of government certainly has downsides, but one of the certain
upsides are the many laboratories of democracy.212 The Court has been right to con-
sider them in its constitutional interpretation in the past, and it should do so again
in Carpenter. And no matter what the Supreme Court decides, such thoughtful state
constitutional interpretation should continue. Increasingly, even those state high
courts that have never diverged from the federal Fourth Amendment are careful to
206 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the
Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Un-
reasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006) [hereinafter Henderson, Learning from
All Fifty States].
207 See Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d 231, 234 (Mass. 2015) (holding
Massachusetts Constitution requires a warrant to obtain over six hours of CSLI); State v.
Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 644 (N.J. 2013) (holding New Jersey Constitution requires a warrant to
obtain CSLI).
208 See Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, supra note 206, at 374–76.
209 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
210 Id. at 574.
211 Id. at 600 (internal citations omitted).
212 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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recognize that they could do so,213 and this is an encouraging trend in a country in
which we all enjoy two layers of constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
In the timeless words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, “Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”214 Carpenter
has the potential to be a monumental Fourth Amendment decision, holding that there
is not a monolithic third party doctrine that annihilates all constitutional protection
for information residing with a third party. Such a holding is essential to balancing
privacy and liberty with government need in the twenty-first century or, as the Fourth
Amendment text would put it, to guaranteeing security in our persons and papers
against unreasonable searches. The Court need go no further than acknowledging
a search took place, however, and prudence dictates that it not. Admittedly, the
resulting litigation and, hopefully, legislation, will not make the next few years easy
for police, criminal defendants, and other litigants. But this path will make it much
more likely that we can find a constitutional balance that best ensures our safety and
security in the coming decades, as the Fourth Amendment commands.
213 See, e.g., State v. Ward, 604 N.W.2d 517, 530 (Wis. 2000) (“Although we generally
conform art. 1, § 11 to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it would be a sad irony for this court
to exhort magistrates to act as something more than ‘rubber stamps’ when issuing warrants,
and to then act as mere rubber stamps ourselves when interpreting our Wisconsin Constitution.
It is our responsibility to examine the State Constitution independently. This duty exists even
though our conclusions in a given case may not differ from those reached by the Supreme
Court when it interprets the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Gomez v. State, 168 P.3d 1139,
1144–45 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (“It is well established that this State may grant protections
to its citizens that are more expansive than those conferred by federal law. It is also settled
that this Court’s independent interpretation of Oklahoma constitutional provisions is not cir-
cumscribed by United States Supreme Court interpretations of similar federal provisions.”
(internal citations omitted)).
214 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
